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ORDER ON CERTAIN PENDING MOTIONS
The above styled action is before the Court on various pending motions, fo wit: (1)
Counterclaim Defendant Timothy Moses’s Motion to Disqualify Alston & Bird, LLP as Counsel
for Defendants (“Motion to Disqualify Alston & Bird”); (2) Aliera Healthcare, Inc.’s Motion for
an Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not Be Held in Contempt for Violating the
Court’s April 25, 2019 Order (“Aliera’s Motion to Show Cause”); (3) Defendants-
Counterclaimants Anabaptist Healthshare and Unity Healthshare, LLC’s Response to Aliera
Healthcare, Inc.’s Show Cause Motion and Cross-Motion for an Order to Show Cause (“AHS and
Unity’s Motion to Show Cause”); (4) Aliera Healthcare, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment; (5) Aliera Healthcare, Inc.’s Motion for Judgmentonthe Pleadings and for Protective
 
Order; (6) Defendants/Counterclaimants Anabaptist Healthshare and Unity Healthshare, LLC’s
Motion to Compel (“AHS/Unity’s Motion to Compel”); (7) Non-Party Trinity Healthshare, Inc.’s
Motion for Protective Order; (8) Defendants/Counterclaimants Anabaptist Healthshare and Unity
Healthshare, LLC’s Motion to Segregate Funds; and (9) Aliera Healthcare, Inc.’s Motion to
Amend the Court’s April 25, 2019 Order. Having considered the entire record, the Court finds as
follows:
I SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff and Counterclaim-Defendant Aliera Healthcare, Inc. (“Aliera”) provides
alternatives to traditional healthcare products, through which members join together to make
monthly contributions to defray medical costs, often referred to as membersharing.Historically,
Aliera designed its offerings around a Direct Primary Care Medical Home (“DPCMH”) model of
care that lowered members’ costs for primary care, wellness, and preventive medicine. Defendant
and Counterclaimant Anabaptist Healthshare (“AHS”) is a non-profit organization that operates a
healthcare sharing ministry (“HCSM7”), an organization whose members share a commonset of
ethical or religious beliefs and who share certain medical expenses among themselves in
accordance with those beliefs. The healthcare products provided by the parties are alternative
programsto traditional insurance. Counterclaim Defendant Timothy Mosesis a former Aliera
officer and former AHS Board member. Counterclaim Defendant Chase Moses, Timothy Moses’
son, is a current Aliera officer and former AHS Board member.
In 2016, the parties entered into a business arrangement under which Aliera and AHS,
through AHS’s non-profit subsidiary Unity Healthshare, LLC (“Unity”), collaborated to offer their
suite of non-insurance healthcare products and services to members and potential members.
Towards that end, the parties executed a Memorandum of Understanding on October 31, 2016
 which was amended on November 10, 2016. They then executed an “Agreement Between
Anabaptist Healthshare and Aliera Healthcare” (“Agreement”) on February 1, 2017. Thereafter
disputes arose regarding administration of the healthcare sharing program andtheallocation of
profits between the entities, among other disagreements. After a failed mediation, Defendants
terminated the parties’ Agreement on August 10, 2018.
Aliera alleges Defendants’ breached the parties’ Agreement, wrongfully froze bank
accounts and converted funds through which Aliera paid memberclaims,stole its employees and
proprietary information, and interfered with its business relationships, amongother allegations of
misconduct. Aliera asserts the following causesofaction: (1) declaratory judgment to declare the
parties’ relative rights and obligations under the Agreement; (2) breach of the Agreement; (3)
breach of non-disclosure agreements by former Aliera employees (against Alexander Cardona,
Victor Mensavage, and Jeremy Hulkenberg); (4) fraud (against Alexander Cardonarelated to the
cancellation of his employment agreement); (5) breach of fiduciary duty (against Alexander
Cardona, Victor Mensavage, and Jeremy Hulkenberg); (6) violations of the Georgia Computer
Systems Protection Act (against Alexander Cardona, Victor Mensavage, and Jeremy Hulkenberg);
(7) tortious interference with a fiduciary relationship (against AHS, Unity, and Tyler Hochstetler);
(8) violations of Georgia’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act; (9) fraud (against Tyler Hochstetler); (10)
tortious interference with contractualrelations (against AHS, Unity, and Tyler Hochstetler); (11)
defamation (against all Defendants); (12) breach offiduciary duty (against AHS, Unity, and Tyler
Hochstetler); (13) conversion (against all Defendants); (14) unjust enrichment (against all
Defendants); (15) conspiracy (against all Defendants); (16) punitive damages (against all
Defendants); (17) attorneys’ fees (against all Defendants).
Defendants/Counterclaimants, in turn, allege Aliera breached the Agreement, improperly
 attempted to rebrandUnity HCSM plans and members as “Aliera programs” and “Aliera
members”, commingled and misallocated member payments, converted Unity member’s
charitable contributions into Aliera for-profit revenues, wrongly charged Unity for third-party
administration costs and other expenses that Aliera should have paid under their Agreement,
withheld financial and membership information to which Defendants are entitled under the
Agreement, and (after termination of the Agreement) attempted to unilaterally transition Unity
HCSMplans to new plans operated by Trinity Healthshare, LLC (“Trinity”), among other
allegations of misconduct. Counterclaimantsassert the following claimsin their Second Amended
Complaint: (1) declaratory judgment as to the parties’ respective rights and status under the
terminated Agreement (against Aliera); (2) breach of contract (against Aliera); (3) breach of
fiduciary duty (against Aliera, Timothy Moses, and Chase Moses); (4) tortious interference
(against Aliera, Timothy Moses, and Chase Moses); (5) conversion (against Aliera, Timothy
Moses, and Chase Moses); and (6) attorneys’ fees and expenses of litigation (against Aliera,
Timothy Moses, and Chase Moses).
On December 28, 2018, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) that
precluded Aliera from completing a transition of the Unity HCSM plans and membersto Trinity,
a transition which otherwise would have occurred effective January 1, 2019. After a two-day
evidentiary hearing and following the submission of additional briefs and proposed findings, on
April 25, 2019, the Court issued an Order Entering Interlocutory Injunction and Appointing
Receiver(“Interlocutory Injunction Order”). Therein the Court, inter alia, enjoined Aliera from
unilaterally transitioning the Unity HCSM plansin existence as of August 10, 2018 andprior to
that time (hereinafter “Legacy Unity HCSM Plans” and “Legacy Unity HCSM Members”) to
Trinity and appointed Marshall Glade of GlassRatnerto act as Receiver.!
 
On May31, 2019, the Court granted a motion by Aliera to add Victor Mensavage and
Jeremy Hulkenberg as Defendants and to amend the styling of the case to reflect that AHS had
changed its name to Kingdom HealthShare International and that Unity had changed its name to
Kingdom HealthShare Ministries, LLC. That day the Court also granted a motion by AHS and
Unity to name Timothy Moses and Chase Mosesas Counterclaim-Defendants and to amendtheir
Counterclaim to assert claims against those individuals.
OnOctober 18, 2019, the Court granted the parties’ Joint Motion to Wind Down Legacy
Unity HCSM Plans (“Wind Down Order”), approving the winding down of the Legacy Unity
HCSMPlans“as in the best interests of the members.” Pursuant to the order, the Legacy Unity
HCSM Plansterminated on November 18, 2019. However, Aliera has continued to administer
those plans as those members wereeligible to submit their requests to share healthcare expenses
incurred before the termination date over a three-month wind downperiod that expired on February
15, 2020.3
} Aliera appealed the Interlocutory Injunction Order. On June 4, 2020, the Court of Appeals of Georgia
affirmed the Court’s ruling. See generally Aliera Healthcare, Inc. v. Anabaptist Healthshare, 844 S.E.2d 268 (Ga. Ct.
App.2020).
4 Wind Down Order, {ff 3-6.
3 Id.
U. ANALYSIS
A. Timothy Moses’ Motion to Disqualify
Counterclaim-Defendant Timothy Moses has movedto disqualify Alston & Bird, LLP as
counsel for Defendants.
 1. Standard on a Motionto Disqualify Alston & Bird
Georgia courts approach motions to disqualify counsel “with great caution” given the
hardships brought aboutby disqualification. Bernocchi v. Forcucci, 279 Ga. 460, 462, 614 S.E.2d
775, 778 (2005). As explained by Georgia Supreme Court in Bernocchi,
“{t]he right to counsel is an important interest which requires that any
curtailment of the client's right to counsel of choice be approached with
great caution.” Blumenfeld v. Borenstein, 247 Ga. 406, 408, 276 S.E.2d 607
(1981). “[D]isqualification has an immediate adverse effect on the client by
separating him from counsel of his choice, and...inevitably cause[s]
delay.” Reese v. Ga. Power Co., 191 Ga. App. 125(2), 381 S.E.2d 110
(1989). “[A] client whose attorneyis disqualified may sufferthe lossoftime
and moneyin finding new counsel and ‘maylosethe benefit ofits longtime
counsel's specialized knowledge of its operations.’ ” Bergeron _v.
Mackler, 225 Conn. 391, 398, 623 A.2d 489 (Conn.1993). Because of the
right involved and the hardships brought about, disqualification of chosen
counsel should be seen as an extraordinary remedy and should be granted
sparingly. Anderson Trucking Service v. Gibson, 884 So.2d 1046, 1049
(Fla.App.2004).
  
Bernocchi, 279 Ga. at 462. See Hodge v. URFA-Sexton, LP, 295 Ga. 136, 138-39, 758 S.E.2d
314, 318 (2014) (“We approach motions to disqualify with caution due to the consequencesthat
could result if the motion is granted...Additionally, we are mindful of counsel using motions to
disqualify as a dilatory tactic”) (citations omitted); Ga. R. of Prof. Conduct 1.7, Cmt.[15] (“Where
the conflict [of interest] is such as clearly to call into question the fair or efficient administration
ofjustice, opposing counsel mayproperly raise the question. Such an objection should be viewed
with caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of harassment”).
Importantly,“[t]he rules ofdisqualification ofan attorney will not be mechanically applied;
rather, we should look to the facts peculiar to each case in balancing the need to ensure ethical
conducton the part of lawyers appearing beforethe court andother social interests, which include
the litigant’s right to freely chosen counsel.” Cohenv. Rogers, 338 Ga. App. 156, 170-71, 789
 
S.E.2d 352, 363 (2016) (citing Stoddard v. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 173 Ga. App. 467, 468, 326
S.E.2d 827 (1985)). See Befekadu v. Addis Int'l Money Transfer, LLC, 332 Ga. App. 103, 106,
772 S.E.2d 785, 788 (2015). The party seeking disqualification has the burden of demonstrating
that disqualification is warranted. See Cardinal Robotics, Inc. v. Moody, 287 Ga. 18, 21, 694
S.E.2d 346, 349 (2010) (citations omitted).
Georgia courts have held that “[a] motion to disqualify should be made with reasonable
promptness after a party discovers the facts which lead to the motion.” Shuttleworth v. Rankin-
Shuttleworth of Georgia, LLC, 328 Ga. App. 593, 596, 759 S.E.2d 873, 877 (2014) (citing
Rescigno v. Vesali, 306 Ga. App. 610, 613(1), 703 S.E.2d 65, 69 (2010)). “The failure to make a
“reasonably prompt” motion to disqualify counsel can result in waiver.” Zelda Enterprises, LLLP
yv. Guarino, 343 Ga. App. 250, 253, 806 S.E.2d 211, 214 (2017), reconsideration denied (Oct. 20,
2017) (citations omitted).
Four factors are determinative of this issue: [1] the length of the delay in
light of the circumstances of the particular case, inclusive of when the
movantlearned of the conflict; [2] whether the movant wasrepresented by
counsel during the delay; [3] why the delay occurred; and [4] whether
disqualification would result in prejudice to the nonmovingparty.(Citations
and punctuation omitted.) Rescigno, supra, 306 Ga. App. at 613(1), 703
S.E.2d 65. The trial court must weigh these factors against the seriousness
ofthe conflict alleged and the extent to whichthe public's confidencein the
judicial system would be eroded if the motion was denied. Ga. Baptist
Health Care Sys., Inc. v. Hanafi, 253 Ga. App. 540, 542, 559 S.E.2d 746
(2002).
Shuttleworth, 328 Ga. App. at 596.
2. Findings and Conclusions ofLaw
In the instant motion, Counterclaim Defendant Timothy Mosesasks the Court to disqualify
Defense counsel, Alston & Bird, LLP (“Alston & Bird”), from representing
Defendants/Counterclaimants in this action. In 2005, a federal jury found Timothy Mosesguilty
 of securities fraud and perjury. See United States v. Moses, No. 1:04-CR-508-CAP (N.D. Ga.),
ECF 70, 85, 86. Mr. Moses wassentenced on February 17, 2006 to 78 months’ imprisonment
followed by a term of five years’ supervised release and was ordered to pay $1.65 million in
restitution. Id., ECF 95, 96. Judge Pannell subsequently revoked Mr. Moses’s supervised release,
finding he had misled his supervising probation officer about his financial affairs and failed to
disclose bank account information and newlinesofcredit. Id., ECF 145, 149, 150. Mr. Moses’s
supervised release was terminated in April 2015. Id., at ECF 167.
According to his affidavit, Paul N. Monnin joined Alston & Bird in 2017.4 However, he
worked for the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia from 2002 to
2008.° In 2002,he joined the office as an assistant United States attorney (“AUSA”) in its Criminal
Division and served as Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division’s Economic Crimes Section from
2006-2008.° Mr. Monninleft governmentservicein late February 2008.7
During his tenure with the United States Attorney’s Office, Mr. Monnin wasoneof the
AUSAswhoprosecuted the securities fraud and perjury case against Mr. Moses. With respect to
that criminal proceeding, Mr. Monnin aversin part:
WhenI washired as an AUSA,the U.S. Attorney asked that I formalize a
working relationship between the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern
District of Georgia and the Atlanta Regional Office of the U.S. Securities
4 Defendants’/Counterclaim Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Counterclaim Defendant Timothy Moses’s Motion to
Disqualify Counsel(“Opposition Brief’), Ex. A (“Paul N. Monnin Aff.”), 7.
2 Paul N. Monnin Aff., §.
: Id.
Z Id., 995, 15.
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). This led to the formationofa working
group in or about 2002 involving myself on behalf of the U.S. Attorney’s
Office, representatives from the Enforcement Division andthe Trial Unit of
the SEC’s Atlanta Regional Office, the U.S. Trustee Program within the
U.S. Department of Justice, and agents and inspectors from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the Criminal
Investigations Division ofthe Internal Revenue Service, and the U.S. Secret
Service. My involvement on behalf ofthe U.S. Attorney’s Office meant that
 
I was thefirst point of contact if the SEC wished to refer a matter for
criminal prosecution. It further meant that many of my investigations,
prosecutions, and trials involved parallel civil, administrative, and
receivership proceedings brought by the SEC.I was one of the AUSAs who
prosecuted Mr. Timothy Mosesfor securities fraud and perjury in United
States v. Moses, No. 1:04-CR-508-CAP (N.D. Ga.)...I neither took part in
nor was I informed of the separate supervised release revocation
proceedings that were initiated against Mr. Moses by the U.S. Probation
Office for the Northern District of Georgia in 2012-2014.8
Mr. Monninasserts he has not had access to any Justice Department materials associated
with Mr. Moses,other than publicly filed documents,since leaving the U.S. Attorney’s Office in
2008.° Moreover, Mr. Monnin avers Mr. Moses’s prosecution involved the disclosure of discovery
and large volumesoftestimony and evidence in open court proceedings." Although he participated
as an AUSAin Mr. Moses’s prosecution, conviction, and appeal from 2004-2007, he asserts he
has no knowledgeorrecollection of any confidential government information to which he may
have had accessin connection with those criminal proceedings."
With respect to this civil action, Mr. Monninavershefirst became involvedin this matter
“around the time Defendants moved for a temporary restraining order.”!* “Based on [his]
experience withboth interlocutory relief and receivership proceedingsin state and federal courts,
[he] [] provided support to Alston & Bird’s litigators on those subject matters,” and based onhis





experience in “federal and state administrative investigations and enforcement proceedings,” he
“counsel[s] Defendants regarding pending regulatory inquiries.”!> Mr. Monnin “attended the
Court’s January 22, 2019 interlocutory injunction hearing as a resourceforthe firm’s litigation
team and clients.”!4 At the hearing he was approached by counsel for Aliera and Mr. Moses who
 inquired about his attendance and Mr. Monnin advised he wasnot there as a lawyer or a witness
but rather “was there to provide procedural guidance and support to [his] colleagues.”!> Mr.
Monninasserts that “[a]side from [his] limited role in this matter, [he] ha[s] not had any other
engagements in any way involving Mr. Moses.””!®
Having considered the entire record, the Court does not find this matter warrants the
disqualification ofAlston & Bird. Georgia Rules of Professional ConductRule, Rule 1.11 governs
“successive governmentand private employment.”It provides in relevantpart:
Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information
that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a
person acquired whenthe lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not
represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a
matter in which the information could be usedto the material disadvantage
ofthatperson. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake
or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is
screened from anyparticipation in the matter and is apportioned nopart of
the fee therefrom.
Ga. R. Prof] Conduct, Rule 1.11(b) (emphasis added). Rule 1.11(b) “operates only when the
lawyer in question has knowledge of the information, which meansactual knowledge;it does not
operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer.”Id. at Cmt.7.
Further, Rule 1.11(e) defines “confidential government information” to mean any information
“which has been obtained under governmental authority and which,at the timethis rule is applied,
8 Id., $f] 30-31.




the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to
disclose, and which is not otherwise available to the public.”
Although Mr. Monnin may haveat one point had knowledgeofor access to confidential
government information regarding Mr. Moses, the Court doesnotfind that such “could be used to
 
the material disadvantage of’? Mr. Moses in this action. The fact of Mr. Moses’s criminal
conviction and details regarding that conviction are a matter of public record and have been
referenced in filings and proceedings before this Court. Nevertheless, the role that Mr. Moses
convictionhas had andwill havein thislitigation is extremely narrow andis largely limited by the
applicable rules of evidence.
Moreover, the Court is concerned with the delay in raising the purported conflict and the
issue of disqualification. Defendants first moved to join Timothy Moses as a Counterclaim
Defendant on October 10, 2018. On December 21, 2018, Defendants then filed a second motion,
seeking to join both Timothy Moses and his son, Chase Moses, and to amend Defendants’
counterclaim, and the motion was granted on May 31, 2019. However,it is clear that Mr. Moses
has been substantially involvedin this litigation since its inception. Indeed, Mr. Moses submitted
an affidavit in opposition to Defendant’s motion for interlocutory relief and he and his counsel
attended the January 2019 interlocutory injunction hearing—the very hearing attended by Mr.
Monnin at which Aliera and the Mosesesfirst learned of his association with Alston & Bird.
Nevertheless, the matter was not raised whenall of the relevant parties were before the Court. The
motion to disqualify wasnot filed until July 30, 2019. Briefing on the motion was not completed
until December 2019.
Although a hearing on the motion was held on January 29, 2020, the hearing was stopped
and continued to allow the parties an opportunity to confer to try to resolve the issue, subject to
11
Defense counsel’s representation that Mr. Monnin would be screened from this case and other
matters involving Aliera in the interim. Whennoresolution was reached,the parties then requested
an opportunity to complete their oral argument on the motion. Although the Court appreciates the
parties’ attempt to resolve the dispute without further Court intervention, the Court cannot ignore
 
that Alston & Bird has represented Defendants in this action since shortly after the case was
initiated in August 2018. To disqualify counsel at this stage in the litigation would be extremely
and unduly prejudicial, especially when balanced with the minimal role Mr. Moses’s criminal
conviction could conceivably have in thislitigation.
Having considered the entire record and given all of the above, Mr. Moses’s Motion to
Disqualify Alston & Bird is hereby DENIED. However, to avoid any appearance of impropriety,
Mr. Monnin shall remain screened from and can have no involvement whatsoever in the
representation of Defendants in this matter. Further, Mr. Joseph Burby, who apparently wasalso
a prosecutor involved in Mr. Moses’s criminal case and who joined Alston & Bird in February
2020, shall also remain screened from and can have no involvement whatsoever in the
representation of Defendants in this matter. The Court will address evidentiary issues and any
motions in limine with respect to evidence regarding Mr. Moses’s criminal conviction at the
appropriate time and when properly raised.
B. Aliera’s Motion to Show Cause and AHS/Unity’s Motion to Show Cause
(collectively, the “Cross-Motions to Show Cause”)
Shortly after the Court issued its April 25, 2019 Interlocutory Injunction Order, the parties
filed their Cross-Motions to Show Cause, each alleging the other side had violated the Court’s
Interlocutory Injunction Order with respect to their communications with and solicitation of Unity
HCSM members. After conferral with counsel and the Receiver at a May 17, 2019 status
conference and hearing, the Court agreed to hold the Cross-Motions to Show Cause in abeyance
12
pending the parties’ continued conferrals among themselves and with the Receiver to attempt to
resolvethe issuesraised in the motions. In the weeksthat followed, counselreported that the parties
had agreed to a “temporary moratorium” on the solicitation of Unity HCSM members, and
thereafter they continued to meet with the Receiver to work out their disputes related to the
 
solicitation of Unity HCSM members. Having considered the entire record and given that no
further dispute has been presented for a determination by the Court regarding the issuesraised in
the Cross-Motion to Show Cause, those motions are hereby DENIEDin their entirety.
C. Aliera’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
1. Standard on Summary Judgment
Summary judgment should be granted when the movant showsthat “there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the movingparty is entitled to judgmentas a matter of law.”
0.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). Ifthe moving party meetsits initial burden ofproof, the nonmovingparty
cannot rest on mere allegations or denials in its pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this Code section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuineissuefortrial. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(e).
A genuine issue of material fact exists where the facts in the record create a conflict in the
evidenceas to a material issue that could affect the outcome of the case under the governing law.
See Shell v. Tidewater Fin. Co., 318 Ga. App. 69, 69, 733 S.E.2d 375 (2012); Johnson v. Unified
Residential Dev. Co., Inc., 285 Ga. App. 852, 857, 648 S.E.2d 163, 168 (2002). Whenruling on
 
a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant should be given the benefit of all reasonable
doubt, and the court should construe the evidence andall inferences and conclusions therefrom
most favorably toward the party opposing the motion. ARP v. United Cmty. Bank, 272 Ga. App.
331, 331, 612 S.E.2d 534, 536 (2016); Smith v. Tenet Health Sys. Spalding, Inc., 327 Ga. App.
13
878, 879, 761 S.E.2d 409, 411 (2014). See Word v. Henderson, 220 Ga. 846, 848, 142 S.E.2d 244,
246 (1965) (“Where the evidence on motion for summary judgmentis ambiguousor doubtful, the
party opposing the motion must be giventhe benefit of all reasonable doubts andofall favorable
inferences and such evidence construed most favorably to the opposing party opposing the
 motion”).
2. Findings and Conclusions ofLaw
i. Limitation ofliability clause
Aliera movesto limit the relief available to AHS/Unity from Aliera on eachof the claims
asserted in the Second Amended Counterclaim (“SAC”) under a provision in the Agreement
limiting the parties’ liability on claims arising from the Agreement. Specifically, §2.4 of the
Agreementprovides:
EXCEPT FOR (i) A PARTY’S BREACH OF ITS CONFIDENTIALITY
OBLIGATIONS SET FORTH IN SECTION 6 AND(ii) A PARTY’S
INDEMNITY OBLIGATIONS SET FORTH IN SECTION 5 NEITHER
PARTY WILL BE LIABLE TO THE OTHER PARTY FOR ANY
INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, SPECIAL, OR PUNITIVE
DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THIS AGREEMENT, WHETHER
LIABILITY IS ASSERTED IN CONTRACT OR TORT, AND
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER EITHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY SUCH LOSS OR DAMAGETHIS
SECTION DOES NOT LIMIT EITHER PARTY’S LIABILITY FOR
BODILY INJURY (INCLUDING DEATH), OR PHYSICAL DAMAGE
TO TANGIBLE PROPERTY. NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING TO
THE CONTRARY IN THIS AGREEMENT, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED
FOR A BREACH OF SECTION 4.1 (CONFIDENTIALITY
OBLIGATIONS) OR EXCEPT AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION2.5
(INDEMNITY OBLIGATIONS), IN NO EVENT SHALL EITHER
PARTY’S TOTAL LIABILITY TO THE OTHER PARTY IN
CONNECTION WITH, ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS
AGREEMENT EXCEED$5,000 (USD). THE PARTIES AGREE THAT
THE LIMITATION SPECIFIED IN THIS SECTION WILL APPLY
EVEN IF ANY LIMITED REMEDY PROVIDED IN THIS
AGREEMENT IS FOUND TO HAVE FAILED OF ITS ESSENTIAL
PURPOSE.
14
(Capitalized emphasisin original; bold emphasis added)(“Limitation of Liability Clause”).
The Court finds the Limitation of Liability Clause does not as a matter of law limit the
relief potentially available to AHS and Unity on their counterclaims. Asheld in this very action,
“{lJimitation-of-liability clauses may notrelieve a party from ‘liability for acts of gross negligence
 
or wilful or wanton conduct.’” Aliera Healthcare, Inc. v. Anabaptist Healthshare, 844 S.E.2d 268,
 
279 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Holmes v. Clear Channel Outdoor, 284 Ga. App. 474, 477(2), 644
S.E.2d 311 (2007)). See, e.g., Peck v. Rollins Protective Servs., Inc., 189 Ga. App. 381, 383, 375
S.E.2d 494, 496 (1988) (in an action by a homeowneragainst the installer of automatic dialer
alleging breach of warranty, fraud, and negligent installation, reversing summary judgment to
installer predicated on limitation of liability clause where homeowneralleged installer had acted
willfully and wantonly, holding “[a] clause in a contract limiting one's liability for negligent acts
doesnot serve to limit one's liability for wilful and wanton conduct”); Lenny's, Inc. v. Allied Sign
Erectors, Inc., 170 Ga. App. 706, 708, 318 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1984) (in an action by a lessee for
 
uninsured business losses suffered as a result ofa fire, allegations that lessor acted willfully and
wantonly precluded summary judgment limiting liability on the lessee’s claims for breach of
contract and fraud basedon a limitation ofliability clause in the lease). Here, AHS and Unity have
clearly asserted alleged acts of gross negligence or willful or wanton conduct. The evidence
adducedto date raises a jury question on suchallegations, precluding summary judgmentlimiting
Aliera’s liability under the Limitation of Liability clause.
Moreover, §2.4 does not appear to apply to Unity. Thefirst paragraph of the Agreement
expressly defines the terms “Parties” and “Party”: “ALIERA and AHSare sometimesreferred to
collectively as the ‘Parties’ and each individually as ‘Party’.” Unity signed the Agreement, is a
party to it generally, and would be boundbyanycontractualrights and obligations specifictoit.
15
However, §2.4 repeatedly and specifically references the terms “PARTY”and “PARTIES”, at
least appearing to reference Aliera and AHS—not Unity—withrespectto its application. Indeed,
the phrase in §2.4 “[i]n no event shall either Party’s total liability to the other party” suggests an
intent for two parties to be held to the Limitation of Liability Clause, not three. See Pomerancev.
 Berkshire Life Ins. Co. of Am., 288 Ga. App. 491, 494, 654 S.E.2d 638, 641 (2007) (“[I]t is a
cardinal rule of contract construction that a court should, if possible, construe a contract so as not
to render any ofits provisions meaningless and in a mannerthat giveseffectto all ofthe contractual
terms’’) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Aliera’s motion for summary judgment premised on the Limitation of Liability Clause is
hereby DENIED.
ii. Economicloss rule
Aliera argues that insofar as AHS and Unity’s breach of fiduciary duty and conversion
claimsrely on the sameallegations as their breach ofcontract claims and depend on duties imposed
by the Agreementrather than any other source of law, the economicloss rule bars any recovery in
tort against Aliera, Timothy Moses, or Chase Moses.
The purpose of the economic loss rule is to distinguish between those
actions cognizable in tort and those that may be broughtonly in contract...
The economic loss rule generally provides that a contracting party who
suffers purely economic losses must seek his remedy in contract and not in
tort.
ASC Const. Equip. USA,Inc. v. City Commercial Real Estate, Inc., 303 Ga. App. 309, 316, 693
S.E.2d 559, 566 (2010) (citing City of Cairo v. Hightower Consulting Engineers, 278 Ga. App.
721, 728(4), 629 S.E.2d 518 (2006)).
However, where “an independent duty exists under the law, the economic
loss rule doesnot bara tort claim because the claimis based on a recognized
independentduty of care and thus doesnotfall within the scopeoftherule.”
Rosenv. Protective Life Ins. Co., No. 1:09-CV-3620, 2010 WL 2014657,
16
at *9 (N.D.Ga. May 20, 2010) (Duffey, J.) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). This principle has beenapplied in cases wherethe plaintiff
identified a statutory or commonlaw duty that would have existed absent
the underlying contract.
HanoverIns. Co. v. Hermosa Const. Grp., LLC, 57 F. Supp. 3d 1389, 1396 (N.D. Ga. 2014). See
ServiceMaster Co., L.P. v. Martin, 252 Ga. App. 751, 754, 556 S.E.2d 517, 521 (2001) (“It is well
 
settled that mere failure to perform a contract does not constitute a tort. A plaintiff in a breach of
contract case hasa tort claim only where, in addition to breachingthe contract, the defendant also
breaches an independent duty imposed by law”) (citations omitted; emphasis added); Spears v.
Mack & Bernstein, P.C., 227 Ga. App. 743, 745, 490 S.E.2d 463, 465-66 (1997)(“Whileit is true
that in this State, a tort action cannot be based onthe breachof a contractual duty only,...it can be
based on conduct which, in addition to breaching a duty imposed by contract, also breaches a duty
imposed by law. [W]hereprivate duties arise...from relations created by the contract, express or
implied, [one may] pursue a tort action for damagesflowing from the exerciseorfailure to exercise
that duty’) (citations and punctuation omitted).
The Court finds AHS and Unity’s breach of fiduciary duty and conversion claimsare not
barred as a matter of law by the economic loss rule. The Agreement describes the parties’
relationship as that of independent contractors:
The relationship of the Parties is that of independent contractors. This
Agreement does not give either Party the power to direct the day to day
activities of the other, constitute the Parties as partners, joint ventures’, co-
owners or principal-agent, or allow either Party to create or assume any
obligation on behalf of the other Party.
Agreement, §7(i).
However, O.C.G.A. 23-2-58 recognizes that a “confidential” or fiduciary relationship
arises “where oneparty is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence overthe will, conduct,
and interest of another or where, from a similar relationship of mutual confidence, the law requires
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the utmost good faith, such as the relationship between partners, principal and agent, etc.” Here,
notwithstanding Aliera’s status as an independent contractor, Aliera and the Moseses exercised a
“controlling influence over the...interest[s] of’ AHS and Unity, including their confidential
information, assets and the Legacy Unity HCSMPlans.
 
Further, the Agreement provides: “Upon termination of this Agreement, all licenses
granted hereundershall immediately terminate, and the Parties will promptly destroy or return all
materials in its possession which belong to the other Party, including any andall confidential
information which may have comeinto its possession...” Agreement, §3.2. Nevertheless, when
AHSand Unity terminated the Agreement in August 2018, Aliera and the Moseses continued to
“exercise a controlling influence” over AHS and Unity’s “interests” outside of the parameters of
the Agreement. Moreover, AHS and Unity have alleged claims against the Mosesesarising from
duties that derive from their roles as members ofAHS’s BoardofDirectors, duties independent of
the Agreement. Given the foregoing, the Court finds a jury question exists as to whether
independent duties imposed by law arose under the circumstancesofthis case that were breached.
Additionally, AHS and Unity allege Aliera and the Moseses converted their assets. The
economic loss rule doesnot apply to the conversion claims because those claims “allege conduct
that was not merely a failure to perform under the contract, but rather a willful and wrongful
conversion of [AHSand Unity]'s property for personal use.” HanoverIns. Co., 57 F. Supp. 3d at
1397. “Courts have repeatedly recognized that intentional misconductin the course of a contractual
relationship can give rise to a separate cause ofaction undertort law.” Id. at 1397-98.
Givenall ofthe above, Aliera’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgmentis hereby DENIED.
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D. Aliera’s Motion for Judgmenton the Pleadings
J. Standard on a Motion for Judgment onthe Pleadings
“Afterthe pleadings are closed but within such timeasnotto delaythetrial, any party may
move for judgment on the pleadings.” O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c). “[WJhen deciding a motion for
 judgment onthe pleadings, the issue is whether the undisputed facts appearing from the pleadings
entitle the movantto judgmentas a matter of law.” Southwest Health & Wellness, L.L.C. v. Work,
282 Ga. App. 619, 623, 639 S.E.2d 570, 575 (2006)(citing Holsapple v. Smith, 267 Ga. App.17,
20, 599 S.E.2d 28, 32 (2004)). Thus,“[t]he grant of [such a motion] under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c)
is proper only wherethere is a complete failure to state a causeof action or defense.” Schumacher
yv. City of Roswell, 344 Ga. App. 135, 138, 809 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2017)(citation omitted).
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and
warrants... judgment on the pleadings “onlyif ... its allegations ‘disclose
with certainty’ that no set of facts consistent with the allegations could be
proved that would entitle the plaintiff to the relief he seeks.” Benedict v.
State Farm Bank, FSB, 309 Ga. App. 133, 134(1), 709 S.E.2d 314 (2011)
(citation omitted). “Put another way, ‘if, within the framework of the
complaint, evidence maybe introduced which will sustain a grantof relief
to the plaintiff, the complaintis sufficient.’”Id.
 
Bush v. Bank ofNew York Mellon, 313 Ga. App. 84, 89, 720 S.E.2d 370, 374 (2011).
It followsthat “‘a trial court is nota trier of fact on a motion for judgmentonthe pleadings”
but rather a court must only “decide whether the undisputed facts appearing from the pleadings
entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law.” Caldwell v. Church, 341 Ga. App. 852, 859,
802 S.E.2d 835, 842 (2017) (citation omitted). For purposes of the motion, “all well-pleaded
material allegations by the nonmovantare taken astrue, and all denials by the movantare taken as
false. But the trial court need not adopt a party's legal conclusionsbased onthese facts.” Work,
282 Ga. App. at 623 (citation omitted). “Further, in considering a motion for judgment on the
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pleadings, a trial court may consider exhibits attached to and incorporated into the pleadings,
including exhibits attached to the complaint or the answer.”Id.
2. Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw
Aliera movesto dismiss AHS and Unity’s claim that Aliera committed tortious interference
 
by soliciting Legacy Unity HCSM members to join a new healthcare program in 2019 offered
through Trinity.
Under Georgia law, the elements of a tortious interference claim include:(1)
improperaction or wrongful conduct by the defendant withoutprivilege, (2)
the defendant acted purposely and with malice withthe intentto injure, (3)
the defendant induced a breachof contractual obligations or caused a party
or third parties to discontinue or fail to enter into an anticipated business
relationship with the plaintiff, and (4) the defendant's tortious conduct
proximately caused damageto theplaintiff.
Tribeca Homes, LLC v. MarathonInc. Corp., 322 Ga. App. 596, 597-8 (2013).
Here, AHS and Unity assert a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations
based on Aliera’s solicitation of Legacy Unity HCSM members in 2019. See, e.g., SAC, J 287-
88 (“After the Court’s April 25, 2019 Order Entering Interlocutory Injunction and Appointing
Receiver, Aliera (in concert with Trinity Healthshare) misrepresented to Unity members and
brokers that ‘Aliera is no longer selling [your/your clients’] healthcare plans with a Unity
HealthShare, LLC component’ when the Court’s Order expressly required Aliera to continue to
offer and administer the Unity HCSMplansto those members. Aliera engagedin that misleading
conductin an effort to transition Unity HCSM plan membersto Trinity in willful violation of the
Court Order. Upon information and belief, Aliera, Timothy Moses and Chase Moses madethese
statements specifically to prevent or dissuade businesses from entering into a contract or other
business relationship with Unity and AHS, or to prevent or dissuade Unity members from
remaining on the Unity HCSMplans”).
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Aliera asserts the tortious interference claim fails as a matter of law becauseit did not act
“without privilege” insofar as it was not a stranger to the Agreementor the businessrelationship
with the Legacy Unity HCSM members. The Court agrees.
To establish under the first element that the defendant acted “without
privilege,” the plaintiff must show that the defendant wasa stranger to the
 
contract or businessrelation at issue. ASC Constr. Equip. USA,Inc. v. City
Commercial Real Estate, Inc., 303 Ga. App. 309, 313, 693 S.E.2d 559
(2010). Underthe so-called “stranger doctrine,” “only a stranger to both the
contract at issue and the business relationship giving rise to and
underpinning the contract maybeliable for tortious interference [with the
contract or the relationship].” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Perry
Golf Course Development, LLC v. Housing Auth. of the City of Atlanta,
294 Ga. App. 387, 390, 670 S.E.2d 171 (2008); Atlanta Market Center
Mgmt. Co. v. McLane, 269 Ga. 604, 608-610, 503 S.E.2d 278 (1998). “One
is not a stranger to the contract just because one is not a party to the
contract...” Id. at 608, 503 S.E.2d 278. Those who havea direct economic
interest in or would benefit from a contract with which theyare alleged to
have interfered (even though not intended third-party beneficiaries of the
contract) are not strangers to the contract and cannot have tortiously
interfered. Id. at 609, 503 S.E.2d 278. Moreover, “all parties to an
interwoven contractual arrangementare [not strangers and therefore] not
liable for tortious interference with any of the contracts or business
relationships.” Id. at 609-610, 503 S.E.2d 278.
 
Mabrav. SF, Inc., 316 Ga. App. 62, 64-65, 728 S.E.2d 737, 740 (2012). See Disaster Servs., Inc.
  
v. ERC P'ship, 228 Ga. App. 739, 741, 492 S.E.2d 526, 529 (1997)(“For purposesofthis type of
tort, ‘privilege’ meanslegitimate economicinterests of the defendantora legitimate relationship
of the defendantto the contract, so that it is not considered a stranger, interloper, or meddler”).
The Court finds Aliera was not a stranger to the contracts with Legacy Unity HCSM
Membersnorwasa stranger to those business relationships. Pursuant to the Agreement, duringits
term Aliera was “the sole and exclusive authorized non-insurancehealth care companyallowed to
marketandsell health care products to Aliera and Unity HealthShare members.” Agreement, §1.3.
Further, Aliera had an economicinterest in those business relationship insofar as it wasentitled to
certain administrative fees associated with those plans. Agreement, §4. Even after the Agreement
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was terminated and this litigation was filed, Aliera continued to administer the Legacy Unity
HCSMPlanssuch that it was nota strangerto those contractual and businessrelations.
Given the above, Aliera’s Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED on
the narrow groundsset forth above. Aliera’s Motion for a Protective Order regarding any discovery
 
soughtby AHSand Unity involving Trinity is addressed separately below.
E. AHSand Unity’s Motion to Compel, Aliera’s Motion for Protective Order,
and Non-Party Trinity’s Motion for Protective Order
1. Relevant Discovery Standards
With respect to the general scope of discovery, O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(b)(1) provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pendingaction, whetherit relates to the claim or defense of the
party seeking discoveryorto the claim or defenseofanyotherparty,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence...
(Emphasis added).
“{I]n the discovery context, courts should and ordinarily do interpret ‘relevant’ very
broadly to mean any matterthat is relevant to anything that is or may becomeanissueinlitigation.”
 
Bowden v. The Med. Ctr., Inc., 297 Ga. 285, 291, 773 S.E.2d 692, 696 (2015) (quoting
Oppenheimer Fund,Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)) (internal punctuation omitted). See
DeLoitte Haskins & Sells v. Green, 187 Ga. App. 376, 376, 370 S.E.2d 194, 195 (1988) (“The
courts of this State have long recognized the overriding policy of liberally construing the
application of the discovery law. To hold otherwise would beto give every litigant an effective
veto of his adversaries’ attempts at discovery”) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). See also
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Sechler Family P'ship v. Prime Grp., Inc., 255 Ga. App. 854, 857, 567 S.E.2d 24, 27 (2002)
(“O.C.G.A. § 9-11-34(c)(1) establishes that the discovery of non-privileged documents also
applies to nonparties. As with discovery requested from parties, the only requirements placed by
the Georgia legislature on discovery requested from nonparties is that the documents must be
 relevant and non-privileged”).
However, the Court must “‘balance[] the right of a party to obtain discovery andthe right
of individuals to be protected from unduly burdensomeoroppressive inquiries.” In re Callaway,
212 Ga. App. 500, 501, 442 S.E.2d 309, 310 (1994).In this regard O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(c) generally
governs the entry of protective orders and authorizes courts to “make any order which justice
requiresto protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden
or expense.” O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(c). “The issuance ofa protective order is a recognition of the fact
that in some circumstances the interest in gathering information mustyield to the interest in
protecting a party.” Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia v. Ambati, 299 Ga. App. 804, 811,
685 S.E.2d 719, 726 (2009)(citation omitted).
Nevertheless, protective orders should not be used as a means to hinder legitimate
discovery and the burdenis on the movant to show “good cause”for its entry. O.C.G.A. §9-11-
26(c). As summarized by the Court of Appeals of Georgia in Caldwell v. Church, 341 Ga. App.
852, 802 S.E.2d 835 (2017):
“O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(c) does establish a general statutory basis for the entry
of protective orders limiting or curtailing discovery under appropriate
circumstances, provided such limitations do not have the effect of
frustrating and preventing legitimate discovery.” Christopher v. State of
Ga., 185 Ga. App. 532, 533, 364 S.E.2d 905 (1988) (citation and
punctuation omitted). Such protective orders, which are within the
discretion of the trial judge, “are intended to be protective—not
prohibitive—and, until such time as the courtis satisfied by substantial
evidence that bad faith or harassment motivates the discoveror’s [sic]
action, the court should not intervene to limit or prohibit the scope of
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pretrial discovery.” Bullard v. Ewing, 158 Ga. App. 287, 291, 279 S.E.2d
737 (1981)
Caldwell, 341 Ga. App.at 861 (no error in denying protective orders where movantsfailed to show
that bad faith or harassment motivated the party seeking certain depositions or what specific
prejudice mightresult from the depositions) (emphasis added). See Galbreath v. Braley, 318 Ga.
App. 111, 113, 733 S.E.2d 412, 414 (2012) (“[P]rotective orders should not be awarded ‘when the
999)effect is to frustrate and prevent legitimate discovery””) (citing Intl. Svc. Ins. Co. v. Bowen, 130
Ga. App. 140, 144, 202 S.E.2d 540 (1973)); Young v. Jones, 149 Ga. App. 819, 824, 256 S.E.2d
58, 62 (1979) (“Good cause for the issuance of a protective order designedto frustrate discovery
must be clearly demonstrated”).
2. Findings and Conclusions ofLaw
i. Discovery regarding Trinity
Aliera and Trinity urge that insofar as the claim for tortious interference related to Trinity
fails as a matter oflaw, AHS and Unity no longer haveanyviable claim regarding Aliera’s business
relationship with Trinity. Further, they assert that insofar as the Court’s April 25, 2019
Interlocutory Injunction Order authorized Aliera and Trinity to compete with AHS and Unity for
the business of Legacy Unity HCSM Members, Trinity’s business operations are not relevant to
any of the remaining issues in this case. Thus, they ask the Court to issue a protective order to
preclude any discovery requests regarding Trinity orits business relationship with Aliera.
However, the fact that the tortious interference claim related to Trinity fails and that the
Court’s Interlocutory Injunction Order permitted the parties to competefor the business of Legacy
Unity HCSM Members does not somehow excise Trinity from the events relevant to and other
claimsstill pendinginthis litigation. Indeed, under AHSand Unity’stheory ofthe case,
Trinity was...the vessel Aliera created to steal Unity’s members and funds.
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Aliera could not take the membersitselfbecauseit is a for-profit corporation
and cannotsatisfy any of the other requirements necessary to qualify as a
valid HCSM.So Aliera created Trinity out of whole cloth and transferred
an Aliera employee and close family friend of Aliera’s founders (the
Moseses) to become the CEO ofTrinity. The contract between Aliera and
Trinity made clear that Aliera truly owned the Trinity plans and membership
roster (something it longer contends with respect to Unity), making Trinity
nothing more than a corporate shell—labeled an HCSM—through which
Aliera could receive contributions from the former Unity HCSM members
it moved to Trinity.7]
See SAC, 4 172-173 (“On November 15, 2018, Aliera notified members who had Unity HCSM
plans that their plans would be transferred to Trinity effective January 1, 2019. Aliera notified
those members that ‘[a]l1 plan features, including eligible medical services, Member Shared
Responsibility Amount (“MSRA”), and monthly membercontribution amounts (how much you
are billed each month) will remain the same. You also retain access to the same network providers
and facilities with the same discounts. Nothing changes on yourplan except for the HCSM name.’
Neither AHSnor Unity authorized the transfer of any Unity HCSM members,plans, or planassets
to Trinity”); 9241 (“‘Aliera has breached the Agreement by sending the November15, 2018 letter to
Unity HCSM plan members informingthem that they would be transitionedto Trinity effective January
1, 2019, in direct contravention of the Agreement’s unambiguous grant to Unity of the HCSM plans
and their assets”); 263 (““Aliera has breached its fiduciary duties to Unity, AHS, and members
participating in any programs or products offered or marketed by Aliera that included a Unity
HCSM componentby representing to such members that they would betransitioned to Trinity
effective January 1, 2019, and by misrepresenting to those members that nothing would change
except the nameoftheir plans”); §] 275 (“With the specific intent to harm AHS and Unity, Chase
Moses has breached his fiduciary duties to Unity, to AHS, and to membersparticipating in any
programs or products offered or marketed by Aliera that included a Unity healthcare sharing
Mt AHS/Unity’s Response to Aliera’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and for Protective Order,pp. 3-4.
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component bynotifying such membersthat their plans would be transferredto Trinity effective January
1, 2019”); 9] 287-289 (“After the Court’s April 25, 2019 Order Entering Interlocutory Injunction
and Appointing Receiver, Aliera (in concert with Trinity Healthshare) misrepresented to Unity
membersand brokersthat “‘Aliera is no longerselling [your/yourclients’] healthcare plans with a Unity
 HealthShare, LLC component” when the Court’s Order expressly required Aliera fo continue to offer
and administer the Unity HCSM plansto those members. Aliera engaged in that misleading conduct
in aneffort to transition Unity HCSM plan membersto Trinity in willful violation of the Court Order.
Upon information and belief, Aliera, Timothy Moses and Chase Moses made these statements
specifically to prevent or dissuade businesses from entering into a contract or other business
relationship with Unity and AHS,orto prevent or dissuade Unity members from remaining on the
Unity HCSMplans. Upon information and belief, Aliera, Timothy Moses and Chase Moses made
these communications with the specific intent to harm AHS and Unity andto benefit Aliera”). See
also AHS/Unity’s Motion to Compel, pp. 10-15; AHS/Unity’s Combined Reply Brief in Support
of Their Motion to Compel and Responseto Trinity’s Healthshare, Inc.’s Motion for Protective
Order, pp. 5-6.
In short, Aliera’s relationship with Trinity is relevant for many reasonsin this case apart
from the tortious interference claim dismissed above. Given that Trinity’s business relationship
with Aliera and its involvementin the events givingrise to still pending claims remain relevant,
information regarding Trinity is discoverable, including information regardingits relationship with
Aliera, its formation, and its conduct with respect to the Legacy Unity HCSM members. Neither
Aliera nor Trinity have presented “substantial evidence that bad faith or harassment motivates”
AHSand Unity’s discovery and absent such,“the [C]ourt should notinterveneto limit or prohibit
the scope of [relevant] pretrial discovery.” Caldwell, 341 Ga. App.at 861.
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Aliera and Trinity’s motions seeking a protective order are hereby DENIED.Further, AHS
and Unity’s motion to compel responses from Aliera to Requests for Production (“RPD”) Nos.79,
80, 81, 83, 84, 85, and 86 and is GRANTED.Similarly, AHS and Unity’s motion to compel Trinity
to produce non-privileged, relevant documents in its possession, custody, or control that are
 
responsive to AHS/Unity’s non-party document requests is also GRANTED.Aliera and Trinity
shall produce non-privileged documents responsive to the foregoing discovery within thirty (30)
daysofthis order.
ii. Discovery requests served on Timothy Moses, Chase Moses, and
Shelley Steele
AHSand Unity moved to compel discovery from Timothy Moses, Chase Moses, and
Shelley Steele, each of whom haveasserted objections to the discovery requests and have refused
to search their personal devices for relevant information. AHS and Unity ask the Court to enter an
order compelling Timothy Moses, Chase Moses, and Shelley Steele to search their personal
computers, files, and electronic devices for documents and communicationsthat are responsiveto
AHSand Unity’s discovery requests.
Aliera asserts AHS and Unity have “not established any factual basis for directing these
individuals to canvass their personal electronic devices or emails for potential responsive
documents”and have “not identified any Georgia case law directing non-parties to search personal
devices based on mere speculation that they might contain responsive evidence.’’® However,
O.C.G.A. §9-11-34—which is applicable to both parties and non-parties (see O.C.G.A. §9-11-
37(c)(1))—authorizes a party to serve on any other party a request to produce materials which
constitute or contain matters within the scope of O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(b) ‘“‘which are in the
possession, custody, or control of the party upon whom the request is served.” No distinction or
8 Aliera’s Response to AHS/Unity’s Motion to Compel,p. 27.
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exception is made between,e.g., materials in the responding party’s work email as opposedto the
party’s personal email.If it is not privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure,and is relevant,
responsive to a properly served discovery request, and is in the “possession, custody, or control of
the party upon whom the requestis sold,” the matter is discoverable.
 
However, Ms. Steele, Tim Moses, and Chase Moses,also “assert their Fifth Amendment
rights to resist producing documents from any personal devices that do not belong to Aliera.”"
Specifically, they contend:
requiring [them] to respond to Unity’s requests for production would
encroach on [their] Fifth Amendment rights by compelling an act of
production that confirms that a responsive document exists, that [they]
possessorcontrolit (at this time), and that any such documentis authentic
as of the date of production. Because any such response would constitute a
statement or communication that the requested document exists—and is
possessed or controlled, and is authentic—and because such a
communication would constitute a link in the chain of evidence that could
be used to incriminate [them], the Fifth Amendmentprovidesconstitutional
production against such a compelled response. Further, compliance with
these requests would constitute a testimonial communication that [they]
believe that any produced documentis the one demandedin the Requestfor
Production. Thus, compliance with these requests would require [them] to
make use of the “‘contents of [their] own mind’ in identifying...the
documents responsiveto the [Request]”; once again, the Fifth Amendment
products such testimonial communications.”
See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2047, 147 L. Ed. 2d 24 (2000);
Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 20, 121 S. Ct. 1252, 1254, 149 L. Ed. 2d 158 (2001); United States
v. Greenfield, 831 F.3d 106, 114-16 (2d Cir. 2016)).
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. The Georgia Constitution contains a similar privilege against self-
incrimination, providing that no person shall be compelled to give
testimony tending in any mannerto beself-incriminating. Ga. Const. of
1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVI. See also O.C.G.A. § 24-5-505 (a) (“No party
or witness shall be required to testify as to any matter which may
o Aliera’s Response to AHS/Unity’s Motion to Compel,p. 28.
a Id., pp. 28-29.
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incriminate or tend to incriminate [himself] or which shall tend to bring
infamy, disgrace, or public contempt upon [himself] or any memberof[his]
family.”). The privilege protects a party from “the cruel trilemmaofself-
accusation, perjury or contempt.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Michiganv. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445(IID, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182
(1974).
This privilege against self-incrimination extends not only to those answers
that would support a conviction, but also to answers creating a “real and
appreciable” dangerof establishing a link in the chain of evidence needed
to prosecute. Axson v. Nat. Surety Corp., 254 Ga. 248, 250, 327 S.E.2d 732
(1985); see also Dempsey [v. Kaminski Jewelry, Inc., 278 Ga. App. 814,
815, 630 S.E.2d 77, 79 (2006)]. Where a party chooses to invoke the
privilegein a civil proceeding, the result is that the factfinder may infer
that the documents would have been harmful. See In the Matter of
Henley, 271 Ga. 21, 22 (2), 518 S.E.2d 418 (1999)(noting that an “adverse
inference ... could have been drawn had [defendant] refused production
based uponhis privilege against self-incrimination”).
U-Haul Co. of Arizona v. Rutland, 348 Ga. App. 738, 749, 824 S.E.2d 644, 654-55 (2019)
(emphasis added).
“Tt is beyond question that a party may invoke his Fifth Amendmentprivilege to matters
sought to be discovered in civil proceedings.” Axson, 254 Ga. at 249 (citing United States v.
Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 763, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970); McCarthy v. Armdstein, 266 U.S. 34, 45
S.Ct. 16, 69 L.Ed. 158 (1924); Savannah Surety Associates, Inc. v. Master, 240 Ga. 438, 241
S.E.2d 192 (1978). “Nevertheless...‘[t]here is no blanket Fifth Amendment right to refuse to
answerquestions in civil proceedings...The privilege must be specifically claimed ona particular
question and the matter submitted to the court for its determination asto the validity of the claim.”
U-Haul Co. of Arizona, 348 Ga. App. at 749 (citing Dempsey, 278 Ga. App. at 815(1)(a)). See
Axson, 254 Ga. at 249 (“[W]here a party invokes the privilege against self-incrimination in
discovery matters, he may not make a blanket refusal to answerall questions, but mustspecifically
respond to every question, raising the privilege in each instance he determines necessary...The
party seeking discovery is then entitled to make a motion to compel discovery...It thereafter
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becomes the responsibility of the trial court to determine whether the refusal to respond to
discoveryis within the privilege claimed...”).
Having considered the record, insofar as Timothy Moses, Chase Moses, and Shelley Steele
have asserted their Fifth Amendment right to resist producing documents from any personal
 
devices that do not belong to Aliera and which act of production they contend would serve as a
testimonial communication that would constitute a link in the chain of evidence that could be used
to incriminate them, the Court will not compel them produce documents from their personal
devices. Nevertheless, because they have chosento invokethe privilege in this civil proceeding,
“the result is that the factfinder may infer that the documents would have been harmful.” U-Haul
Co. of Arizona, 348 Ga. App. at 749; In the Matter of Henley, 271 Ga. at 22(2).
iii. Discovery requests served on Aliera
AHSand Unity move to compel Aliera to fully respond to Unity’s requests for financial
information from Aliera, including: complete and unredacted documents and information
regarding bank accounts that held Unity funds (see RPD Nos. 42, 43, 44, 52); documents and
information regarding how Aliera managed Unity’s finances (see Interrogatory Nos. 12, 13; RPD
No. 53); documents and information regarding the expenses Aliera charged on Unity’s financial
statements duringthe parties’ relationship (see Interrogatory No. 14; RPD Nos. 50, 51); documents
and information explaining Aliera’s allocation of membercontributions and any fair market value
analysis of the business relationship between Aliera and AHS/Unity (see RPD Nos. 55, 62); and
information and documents regarding payments madeto Aliera’s principals (see RPD No. 58).
The Court finds these requests seek relevant information and appear reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. Aliera is orderedto fully respond to these requests within
thirty (30) days of the entry ofthis order.
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AHSand Unity move to compel Aliera to fully respond to Unity’s requestsrelating to the
plans Aliera administered, including: information and documents regarding the products Aliera
sold prior to its business relationship with Unity and the price charged for those products which
mayberelevantto the allocation of membercontributions between Aliera and Unity products (see
 
Interrogatory No. 4; RPD No. 18); and information and documents regarding non-Unity products
Aliera sold duringthe parties’ relationship,including but not limited to those containing an HCSM
component(see Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6, 7; RPD Nos. 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29, 54). The Court finds
these requests seek relevant information and appear reasonablycalculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence. Aliera is orderedto fully respond to these requests withinthirty (30) days
of the entry of this order.
AHSand Unity also ask the Court to compel Aliera to fully respond to Unity’s discovery
requests seeking information and documents regarding: Aliera employees who performedservices
related to Unity, their roles and responsibilities, and how they were compensated (see Interrogatory
No. 16); the development of Aliera’s brokerlist, membership, and claims and pricing matrices
(RPD No. 34); and the contents of a USB drive Alexander Cardona returned to Aliera on
September26, 2019 relevant to Aliera’s claim for misappropriation of trade secrets (Second RPD
No. 1). The Court finds these requests seek relevant information and appear reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Aliera is ordered to fully respond to these requests
within thirty (30) days of the entry of this order.
AHSand Unity also ask the Court to require Aliera to add certain “key employees”likely
to have information relevant to the parties’ claims and defenses as document custodians from
which Aliera will search for responsive documents. Specifically, AHS and Unity ask to add Terry
Moore(Aliera’s Director of Claims), Lesli Smith (Aliera’s Vice President of Marketing), and Matt
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Voykovic (Aliera’s Call Center Account Manager) as document custodians. Having considered
the record and given thelikelihood these individuals possess information relevantto the parties’
claims and defenses, the Court orders Aliera to add these individuals as documents custodians
from which Aliera will search for responsive documents.
 
tv. Additionalinstructions
Notably, Aliera asserts it has no objection to andhas already producedoris in the process
ofproducing non-privileged information responsiveto several of the discovery requests presented
in AHS/Unity’s Motion to Compel. See, e.g., Aliera’s Response to AHS/Unity’s Motion to
Compel, pp. 14-15 (“In sum, as to Interrogatories 10, 12-16, 22, and 26 and Requests for
Production 42-44, 50-53, 55, and 62, as well Unity’s Second Request for Production served
January 10, 2020, AHS/Unity’ motion to compel only makes work for the Court. Aliera has (1)
already agreed to produce documents; (2) in some cases, has already produced responsive
documents; (3) continues to search for responsive, non-privileged documents; and (4) will supply
or supplement narrative interrogatory responses once it has completed document review”).
Nevertheless, to avoid any misunderstanding on the relevance and discoverability ofthe discovery
requests raised in the Motion to Compel and to avoid any further delays, the Court rules on those
requests and orders a firm deadline by which production should be madein order to advancethis
case towardsits resolution.
The Court further notes that, in fully responding to the discovery requests outlined above,
it is insufficient for Aliera to state “it has already produced documentssufficient to show the flow
of funds received from customers with health care plan that included a Unity HCSM component”
or to insist that it has “already produced reamsoffinancial records” responsive to the discovery
requests. Although the Court appreciate the volume ofdiscovery atissue in this litigation, volume
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alone doesnotsatisfy a party’s discovery obligations, particularly when it remains unclear what,
if any, responsive documents have not been produced.
To avoid any misunderstanding, Aliera must produce unredacted all non-privileged,
relevant documents in its possession, custody, or control that are responsive to the document
 
requests as outlined above. To the extent Aliera asserts it has already producedall such non-
privileged documents and information responsive to a particular request (whether in its rolling
production to date or throughits productionrelative to the Receiver’s investigation), Aliera must
so affirmatively state. To the extent the response to an interrogatory requires a narrative to be
complete, the narrative should be provided. To the extent discovery responses involve
commercially sensitive information, the Court is satisfied Aliera can respond to the requests
subject to the protections and protocolsset forth in the parties’ Consent and Stipulated Protective
Order. See Sechler Family P'ship, 255 Ga. App.at 859 (“[A] confidentiality order has been entered
in this case, and the Sechler entities may seek an additional confidentiality order if necessary.
Whenparties or nonparties contend that discovery requests unduly invade their privacy, suitable
protective orders insuring confidentiality may be sought...And, even if the documents sought to
be produced are not themselves admissible evidence, they are still discoverable so long as they
appear reasonablycalculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’’) (footnote omitted).
Finally, if Aliera (or any party) is withholding responsive documents onthe basis of any
privilege or work-productdoctrine, it must prepare a privilege log clearly identifying all responsive
materials for which the asserted objections apply. The privilege log shall describe the nature ofall
materials withheld or redacted and shall “do so in a mannerthat, without revealing information
itself privileged or protected, will enable otherparties to assess such claim.” See Uniform Superior
Court Rule 5.5.
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3. Conclusion and Requestforfees and expenses
Givenall of the above, AHS/Unity’s Motion to Compel is GRANTEDassetforth above;
Aliera’s Motion for Protective Order is DENIED;and Trinity’s Motion for Protective Orderis
DENIED.
 
AHSand Unity request their reasonable attorneys’ fees and expensesincurred in pursuing
the Motion to Compelpursuant to O.C.G.A. §9-11-37(a)(4)(A). The Court will defer consideration
of the request for fees and expenses pending Aliera’s compliance with this order and consideration
of Aliera’s own Motion to Compel whichwill be considered and addressed separately.
F. Aliera’s Motion to Amend the Court’s April 25, 2019 Order
In its motion, Aliera asserts that in administering Aliera/Unity program, Aliera contracted
with a third-party administration (“TPA”) to review members’ requests to share healthcare costs.
Once the TPA approved the requests that met the Member Guidelines’ eligibility requirements,
Aliera would transfer member fundsto the TPA to pay qualifying requests. Aliera asserts it would
deposit funds designated for healthcare paymentsinto a “zero-balance”accountthat the TPA could
then draw from to pay approved requests.
In July 2018, AHS/Unity froze two Unity bank accounts before terminating the parties’
Agreement. Aliera asserts one of those accounts was a zero-balance accountthat held $3.2 million
in memberfunds that Aliera had madeavailable to the TPA to pay Aliera/Unity members’ requests
to share healthcare expenses. At the January 2019 Interlocutory Injunction hearing, Tyler
Hochstetler acknowledged the funds had been frozen andtestified they remained in the account.?!
Although AHS/Unity terminated the parties’ Agreement on August 10, 2018, Aliera
continued to administer Aliera/Unity plans and, pursuant to the Court’s April 25, 2019
2 Interlocutory Injunction Hearing Tr., pp.147-149,168.
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Interlocutory Injunction Order, has continued administering healthcare plans with a Unity HCSM
component, subject to the Receiver’s oversight. This includes continuing to collect member
contributions and to administer the plans by having a TPA review and payeligible requests.
However, as noted above, on October 18, 2019, the Court approved the parties’ joint request to
 
wind downthe Aliera/Unity plans. Those plans terminated on November 18, 2019 and members
had until February 15, 2020 to submit their requests to share healthcare expenses.
Aliera asserts it is now administering the final Aliera/Unity legal requests for sharing and,
as of March 10, 2020, at least $6.67 million in healthcare sharing requests were pending and
remainedto be paid through the TPA.” Pursuant to the Wind Down Order, Aliera has contributed
its own funds to cover member sharing requests as the plans wind down. However, Aliera here
moves the Court to modify the Interlocutory Injunction Order to direct AHS/Unity to apply the
$3.2 million in frozen healthcare funds to pay the Legacy Unity HCSM Members’ healthcare
expenses, subject to the Receiver’s oversight. Because those funds were properly allocated to
Unity healthcare expenses, Aliera urges the funds cannot and should not be used for any other
purpose.
AHS/Unityassert the parties agreed and the proposed wind downoflegacy accounts was
expressly contingent upon Aliera continuing to use the Unity fundsin its possession to pay sharing
requests through the completion of the wind down.Asstated in the parties’ motion:
Requests to share medical expenses incurred on or before November15,
2019 will continue to be administered andeligible for sharing in accordance
with the Member Guide for a wind downperiod of three months, which
Aliera has voluntarily contributed despite the pendency of the Moving
Parties’ dispute...
The Moving Parties continue to dispute their rights and responsibilities
regarding the Legacy Unity HCSMPlansand anyplanassets, but they and
Mr. Glade agree that winding down of the Legacy Unity HCSM Plansis
v 8 Aliera’s Motion to Amend the Court’s April 25, 2019 Order, Ex. A (James Butler, III Affidavit), 6.
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appropriate without prejudicing any party’s position in thelitigation. At Mr.
Glade’s direction, and to reduce the risk that the ongoing administration of
the Legacy Unity HCSM Plans, as directed by the Court’s Order, would in
any wayinterfere with the paymentofeligible sharing requests or medical
expenses, Aliera will voluntarily contribute funds sufficient to pay eligible
sharing requests for medical expenses incurred on or before November18,
2019 as described herein. Aliera will continue to administer any such share
requests received during a three-month wind downperiod that shall expire
on February 15, 2020. The MovingParties and Mr. Glade acknowledge and
agreethat Aliera’s contribution of funds for this purpose does not waive any
of the Moving Parties’ rights, including but not limited to any rights the
Moving Parties may have under the parties’ Agreement, and will not
prejudice the Moving Parties’ opportunity and right to seek compensation,
repayment, damages, or any otherform ofrelief from any party, person or
entity.23]
Similarly, the Wind Down Order—which was submitted as a consent order—providesin part:
“Aliera has agreed to voluntarily contribute funds to pay eligible sharing requests for medical
expensesincurred on or before November 18, 2019 that are submitted before the expiration of the
wind downperiod on February 15, 2020.’
Giventhe claims in dispute and the Court’s ruling, infra, on AHS and Unity’s Motion to
Segregate Funds and becauseit appears clear from the parties’ joint motion and the Wind Down
Orderthat Aliera agreed to pay health sharing requests during the wind downperiod subjectto its
right to its right to pursue claims and damagesin this litigation, the Court finds no basis to amend
the Interlocutory Injunction Order or the Wind Down Order. Aliera’s motion is DENIED.
G. AHSand Unity’s Motion to Segregate Funds
As noted above, the Court’s Interlocutory Injunction Order appointed Mr. Glade to serve
as a Receiver. The Court ordered that:
The receiver shall examine Aliera’s and Unity’s books and records as
necessary to determine the total amount of funds in Aliera’s possession,
custody, or control corresponding to the Unity HCSM component of
memberplans. Aliera shall segregate those funds — i.e., the Unity HCSM
3 Joint Motion to Wind Down the Legacy Unity HCSM Plans, $6,10.
4 Wind Down Order, 96.
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planassets — to an account over whichthe receiver shall have access and
oversight.
Interlocutory Injunction Order, p. 29 (emphasis added).
According to AHS and Unity, throughoutthe parties’ business relationship Aliera collected
membercontributions for the bundled Aliera/Unity HCSM product, failed to segregate out non-
profit Unity funds, and then further commingled the funds by placing them in Aliera’s own account
for its own for-profit purposes. AHS and Unity assert Aliera still has not segregated any Unity
funds andhas failed to maintain reliable financial statements concerning its possession of Unity
funds. Further, they argue Aliera continues to improperly hold tens of millions of dollars of Unity
fundsthat should have beenreturned to Unity upon terminationofthe parties’ business relationship
in August 2018. In orderto protect those funds from misappropriation duringthe litigation and in
accordancewith the Interlocutory Injunction Order, AHS and Unity now ask the Court to require
Aliera to segregate certain funds into a separate account during the pendencyofthislitigation.
The Receiver has now “examined Unity’s books and records maintained by Aliera in order
to assess the operating financial results from January 1, 2017 through June 30, 2019.” The
Receiver’s examination indicates that between 2017 and 2019 Aliera collected approximately $300
million in member contributions for Aliera and Unity products collectively. The Receiver then
calculated the financial performance of Unity under two scenarios to allocatemember payments,
managementfees and third-party administrator fees. As described in the Receiver’s Initial Report:
Scenario A summarizes the financial results based on the allocation of
member payments andthird-party administrator expenses currently asserted
by Aliera. Scenario B summarizes the financial results based on the
allocation of member payments and third-party administrator expenses
currently asserted by Unity. The allocation assumptionsare as follows:
i. Scenario A assumes 35% of the monthly payments for the bundled
products are allocated to Unity and the entire third-party
a Receiver’s Initial Report (November 11, 2019), p. 7.
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administrator fee is a Unity expense;
ii. Scenario B assumes 68% of the monthly paymentsfor the bundled
products are allocated to Unity and the third-party administrator fee
is not a Unity expense;
iii. Both Scenarios include an adjustmentofthe allocations related to
Unity-only products and the application fees; and
iv. The two parties dispute how the management fee described in
Section 4 of the Agreement should be calculated. Both scenarios
calculate the management fee in the same way. A change in the
allocations affects the management fee calculations. For example,
an increase in Unity allocations results in an increase in the
managementfee payable from Unity to Aliera.”2s]
The Receiver has now updated his analysis from June 2019 through April 2020. The
Receiver has also reviewed the instant Motion to Segregate Funds and has provided a
recommendationthat “assumesa 50/50split of revenue associated with the [Aliera/Unity] bundled
product (essentially the mid-point between the parties[’] preferred revenue allocations.’?’
Ultimately, the Receiver recommendsthat the Court direct Aliera to segregate $15,822,509.00.
In their motion, AHS and Unity note that although the Receiver was able to determine the
total amount of membercontributions for the Aliera and Unity products collectively, he did not
determine what percentage of the member contributions should be allocated to Unity and Aliera
as the allocation is not dictated by the parties’ Agreement and remains a disputed issue in this
litigation. However, “[a]llocating membercontributions consistently with the Receiver’s analysis
of medical expense payments made wouldresult in 68 percentof all member contributions being
allocated to Unity and 32 percent of all member contributions allocated to Aliera.’”® AHS and
Unity urge: “Because the amountof claims expense paid is a commonsense proxy for the value
of a plan to its members,it is eminently reasonable and appropriate for purposesofsegregationfor
ae Receiver’s Initial Report (November 11, 2019), p. 6 (emphasis in original).
27 Receiver’s Recommendation on Defendants/Counterclaimants Anabaptist Healthshare and Unity
Healthshare, LLC’s Motion to Segregate Funds (“Receiver’s Recommendation’),p. 3.
8 AHSand Unity’s Motion to Segregate Funds,p. 9.
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the revenue allocation to be consistent with the relevant percentage of claims paymentsfor the two
sides of the bundled plans.”? Thus, based on a 68/32 split and the Receiver’s “Scenario B”
allocation described above and after subtracting expenses attributable to Unity, AHS and Unity
ask to the Court to order Aliera to segregate at least $89,100,161.65 in an accountunder the control
 
of the Court and the Receiver. Alternatively, AHS and Unity recommenda segregation of funds
at a 50/50 allocation split under which Aliera would be required to segregate $37,973.431.65.
Aliera asserts that “[a]fter winding downin 2019, the joint program lost money and there
are no Aliera/Unity fundsleft to fight about.’° Aliera contends, at the request of the Receiver,it
has already set aside funds from which to pay the final requests to share healthcare expenses.
However, AHS and Unity have not shown, and the Receiver has not determined, that Aliera is
holding any Unity funds as the Court’s Interlocutory Injunction Order requires as a condition for
segregating any funds.
Having considered the entire record and,in particular, the Receiver’s interim reports and
his testimony at a July 17, 2020 hearing during which the Receiver carefully described his
investigation and accounting activities and the rationale and methodology behind his
recommendation to the Court on the instant motion, the Court finds the Receiver’s
recommendation well-reasoned. It strikes an appropriate balance given the funds Alierais likely
holding in a fiduciary capacity, the claims and issues that remain in dispute, and the need to
segregate fundsin light of same.
Accordingly, the Court here adopts the Receiver’s recommendation and ORDERSAliera
to segregate $15,822,509.00 in a separate, interest bearing account over which the Receiver shall
have accessand oversight. See O.C.G.A. §9-8-3 (“Equity may appointa receiverto take possession
9 AHSand Unity’s Motion to Segregate Funds, p. 7.
30 Aliera’s ResponseBrief, p. 1.
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of and hold, subject to the direction of the court, any assets charged with the paymentof debts
where there is manifest dangerofloss, destruction, or material injury to those interested’”’). Those
fundsshall not be used during the pendencyofthis litigation without approval of the Receiver or
order of the Court.
 
SO ORDEREDthis 19™day of August, 2020.
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
Aliera Healthcare, Inc. v. Anabaptist Healthshareet al. (2018CV308981)
Order on Certain Pending Motions
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